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Eric A. Hanushek 
By sheer size consideration, schools deserve the attention of policy makers. 
Annual direct expenditure on education has been running at about 70% of total 
business spending on new plant and equipment. In terms of industry compari- 
son, educational expenditure exceeds the combined value of shipments from 
primary and fabricated metals and is roughly equal to shipments of transporta- 
tion equipment. In terms of  governmental spending, education is one-quarter 
of total social welfare spending-slightly  less than governmental spending on 
all health and medical care and approaching twice the amount spent on public 
aid. These comparisons  also illustrate common alternative ways of  viewing 
education. It’s an investment in the productive capacity of the nation; it’s a raw 
material used in production; and it’s an expenditure that from the government’s 
viewpoint  relates  to  general  social  welfare  and  to distributional  concerns. 
These are all issues that will be covered later in this paper. 
Nobody,  however,  believes  that  our schools  are  doing  particularly  well. 
Widespread  dissatisfaction  with  the  performance  of  schools,  as  opposed 
merely to size of the sector, has propelled education to a position high on the 
policy agenda. Yet the source of this dissatisfaction varies. Some people focus 
on student outcomes-whether  the products of the schools can read and com- 
pute at an acceptable or desirable level. Others are more concerned with distri- 
butional aspects, concentrating on racial and economic differences in school- 
ing and the rewards of  schooling. Still others identify cost growth as the key 
problem, at least cost growth when compared to perceptions of performance 
of the schools. Another group focuses its attention on the role of government 
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in providing education, arguing variously that government does a poor job (in 
terms of costs and performance)  or too good a job (in terms of introducing 
specific values, moral views, and the like). 
As is frequently the case, a portion of the difference in viewpoints comes 
from differences  in  preferences.  Some people  simply  value  education for 
themselves and for others more or less than other people do, and this tends to 
affect the evaluation of school performance. But a substantial part of the differ- 
ence comes from people looking at the same data and interpreting them differ- 
ently. A good part of this seems to reflect long-standing issues about the mea- 
surement of educational outcomes, but basic analytical questions also intrude. 
The analytical base for much of the current discussion  is built on  school 
attainment-simple  years of school completed. This choice is convenient for 
both theoretical and empirical discussions and is undeniably useful  in many 
contexts. Nevertheless, the central focus of current policy deliberation is qual- 
ity of schooling,  not quantity, and the arguments and analysis pertaining  to 
quantity do not readily transfer to quality. This paper considers both quantity 
and quality arguments and then pursues issues of quality, particularly quality 
of elementary and secondary schools. Central concerns in the discussion are 
issues of efficiency and of equity. These issues are directly intertwined in edu- 
cational debates because of  the  measurement and policy  approaches  com- 
monly taken in distributional  assumptions. Efficient spending is assumed, so 
that expenditure variations can be used to gauge the distribution of educational 
services. Obviously, if expenditure is not a good measure of educational qual- 
ity, equity discussions based on expenditure can be misleading. 
The central thesis of this paper is straightforward. Much of the policy dis- 
cussion  about education is built on a poor understanding  of the underlying 
structure of education and schools, but the ambiguities and uncertainties lead 
to systematic biases toward increased spending on schools. Evidence on high 
rates of return  to investment in quantity  of schooling are translated  into in- 
creased spending aimed at improving quality, yet with little assurance of actual 
improvement.  Similarly, concerns about equity and about externalities from 
schooling push spending up without satisfying these objectives. A related is- 
sue, addressed  at the end of the paper, is how citizens view spending in the 
context of their local districts. Preliminary analysis of voting on school budgets 
in New York State suggests no systematic relationship between performance of 
schools (measured in terms of student achievement) and willingness to support 
proposed budgets. 
3.1  A Brief History of Schooling in America 
3.1.1  Quantity Considerations 
Economists view schooling as an investment both by individual students and 
by the society at large. Both incur costs and both reap rewards. For an individ- 
ual student, the costs of education include the direct costs of tuition, books, 61  Rationalizing School Spending 
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and other school-related expenditures as well as the income that the student 
forgoes when attending school instead of taking a paying job. Similarly, soci- 
ety incurs direct costs in subsidizing a school system that provides free educa- 
tion to millions. It also forgoes the opportunity to devote to other projects the 
skills, people, and resources that are engaged in education. This viewpoint- 
regarding education as an investment-was  brought into mainstream econom- 
ics over three decades ago by Schultz (1961, 1963) and Becker (1993) and has 
been  the  basis  of  a  steady  stream  of  subsequent  theoretical  and  empirical 
analyses. 
A look at the history of the twentieth century suggests that schooling has 
generally  been  a  good  investment.  Individuals  have  dramatically  increased 
their own investments in education. At the turn of  the twentieth century, only 
6% of the adult population had finished high school. After the First World War, 
high school graduation rates began to increase rapidly. But changes in educa- 
tion work their way slowly through the overall population. By 1940, only half 
of Americans aged twenty-five or older had completed more than eight years 
of school-that  is, had had any high  school education at all. Not until  1967 
did the median adult aged twenty-five or over complete high school.' 
Since 1967, however, the increase in the number of years of schooling com- 
pleted by Americans has slowed. The young adult population, aged twenty-five 
to twenty-nine, has had  stable completion rates for almost two decades (see 
fig. 3.1). Since the overall schooling level is determined by the accumulation 
I. See U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, 1993; and Goldin 1994a. 1994b. 62  Eric A. Hanushek 
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of prior school attainment, this stabilized schooling has slowed dramatically 
the growth in schooling for the adult population as a whole. Today, the median 
years of school completed by Americans over twenty-five rests at slightly less 
than thirteen years. 
The benefits of education to individuals are clear. The average incomes of 
workers with a high school education remain significantly above those of the 
less educated, and the incomes of workers with a college education now dwarf 
those of the high school-educated. The explosion in the earnings of college- 
educated workers, charted in figure 3.2,  provides them with a premium of more 
than 70% higher earnings than a high school graduate with similar job experi- 
ence.* Not only are wages higher for the better educated, but they also enjoy 
greater job opportunities and suffer less unemployment. The common interpre- 
tation is that our high-technology economy produces ever larger demands for 
skilled workers, workers who can adapt to new technologies and manage com- 
2.  More detail on  the patterns of  earnings can  be  found in  Murphy and Welch  1989, 1992 
and Kosters 1991. McMahon (1991) reports slightly lower private rates of return for high school 
completion than for college completion, although they remain substantial. These calculations all 
rely just on salary differentials, and greater equality in the provision of fringe benefits may act to 
compress the differences for total compensation.  However, no analysis of  schooling returns in 
terms of total compensation is available. 63  Rationalizing School Spending 
plicated production  processes  effectively. So for individuals, at least, the in- 
creased relative incomes of more educated people has been sufficient to offset 
the costs. An individual can expect significant financial benefit from extended 
schooling, even after appropriately considering costs. 
Individuals  also reap nonfinancial  benefits  from education. For example, 
there is evidence that more educated people make better choices concerning 
health, so they tend to live longer and to have healthier  lives. There is also 
evidence that the children of more educated parents get more out of school. 
They attend longer and learn more. Such benefits of schooling simply reinforce 
those from the labor market.3 
Society as a whole also benefits from education. The nation is strengthened 
economically by having workers with more and better skills. National income 
rises directly with individual earnings. Moreover, recent economic studies ar- 
gue that education may provide economic benefits to society greater than the 
sum of its benefits to individuals-by  providing a rich environment for innova- 
tion and scientific discovery, education can accelerate the growth rate of the 
ec~nomy.~  The more educated are more prone to vote in local and national 
elections, and a better-informed  and more responsible electorate improves the 
workings of a democratic ~ociety.~  Increases in the level of education are asso- 
ciated with reductions in crime (e.g., Ehrlich 1975). 
Education has also helped to achieve both greater social equality and greater 
equity in the distribution of economic resources. Schooling was quite rightly 
a centerpiece of the War on Poverty in the 1960s, and the benefits of improved 
schooling are demonstrated in comparisons of the earnings of different social 
and ethnic groups. Earnings by blacks and whites have converged noticeably 
since the Second World War, and much of this convergence is attributable to 
improved educational opportunities for African-Americans.6 Providing an ex- 
act accounting for the benefits  of  education to society  is difficult, because 
many of the benefits education provides are hard to value. But for the purposes 
here, it is safe to say that education has historically  been a good investment 
both for society and for individuals. 
3.1.2  Quality Considerations 
If schooling has been such a good investment, what leads to the widespread 
concern about schools? For most of  this century, debate over the economic 
consequences of schooling concentrated on the amount of school attained or, 
3. Michael 1982; Haveman and Wolfe  1984; Wolfe and Zuvekas 1995; Leibowitz 1974. Many 
factors  are unclear, however, because  of questions  of  causality;  see, for example, Farrell  and 
Fuchs 1982. 
4. See, for example, the analyses of  growth in Lucas 1988, Romer 1990, Barro 1991, and Jor- 
genson and Fraumeni 1992. 
5. The pattern of voting over time can be found in Stanley and Niemi 1994. An analysis of the 
partial effects of educational attainment (which are positive in the face of overall declines in voter 
turnout over time) is presented in Teixeira 1992. 
6.  See Smith and Welch 1989 and Jaynes and Williams 1989. 64  Eric A. Hanushek 
simply, the quantity of schooling of the population. Policy  deliberations fo- 
cused on  school-completion  rates,  on  the  proportion  of  the  population  at- 
tending postsecondary schooling, and the like. And analyses of the benefits of 
schooling were  most concerned with the effects of quantity of  schooling- 
whether benefits  are seen in  terms of  individual incomes or social  benefits 
like improved voting behavior of citizens. For many reasons, however, today’s 
attention is focused on the quality dimension of schooling. 
As the growth in the number of years that Americans spend in school virtu- 
ally stopped, many benefits that Americans might have expected from a contin- 
uously growing educational system have not materialized. Income growth has 
slowed,’ and children no longer routinely surpass the earnings of their parents. 
Income convergence between blacks and whites also has stopped-coincident 
with a slowing in the convergence of the school-completion rates for the two 
groups.8 
At the same time, nations around the world have increased their levels of 
schooling dramatically,  with  completion  rates  from secondary  schools in  a 
number of industrial competitors now rivaling those of the United States. Thus, 
America can no longer be easily assured of a higher quality-workforce than 
those of its trading partners. Both of these new realities shift the focus of the 
educational debate from quantity to quality. Improving the quality of school- 
ing, or how much is learned for each year, has been seen as a possible way of 
counteracting the effects of U.S. slowdown in quantity of schooling. 
The reason for questioning American education is straightforward. There is 
no evidence that increases in the quality of education are making up for the 
slowdown in the growth of  schooling; on the contrary, declining quality may 
be making things worse. As described  subsequently,  data from a variety  of 
sources suggest that the knowledge and skills of students are not as high as 
those measured in America in the past or in other nations currently. Moreover, 
achieving these current levels of student performance is costing much more 
than in the past. 
The economic effects of differences in the quality of graduates of our ele- 
mentary and secondary schools are much less understood than the effects of 
quantity, particularly with regard to the performance of the aggregate economy. 
The incomplete understanding of the effects of educational quality clearly re- 
flects  difficulties  in  measurement. Although quality  of  education  is hard to 
define precisely, I mean the term quality to refer to the knowledge base and 
analytical skills that are the focal point of schools. Moreover, to add concrete- 
ness to this discussion, I will tend to rely on information provided by standard- 
ized tests of academic achievement and ability. Relying on standardized tests 
7. See, for example, Levy and Murnane 1992 for a review of recent earnings patterns. 
8. Discussion of distributional issues including earnings differences by  race can be found in 
Smith and Welch  1989; O’Neill 1990; Kane  1990; Juhn, Murphy,  and  Pierce  1991; Card and 
Krueger  1992b; Grogger  forthcoming;  Levy  and  Murnane  1992; Bound  and  Freeman  1992; 
Boozer, Krueger, and Wolkon 1992; and Hauser 1993. 65  Rationalizing School Spending 
to provide  measures  of quality  is controversial-in  part  because of gaps in 
available evidence and in part because of the conclusions that tend to follow (as 
discussed below).9  Nevertheless, such measures appear to be the best available 
indicators of quality and do relate to outcomes that we care about. 
A variety  of studies of the  labor market have been concerned about how 
individual differences in cognitive ability affect earnings (and modify the esti- 
mated returns to quantity). The early work was subsumed under the general 
topic of “ability bias” in the returns to schooling. In that, the simple question 
was whether the tendency of more able individuals to continue in school led to 
an upward bias in the estimated returns to school (because of a straightforward 
omitted-variables  problem). lo The correction  most commonly employed  was 
the  inclusion of a cognitive ability or cognitive achievement measure in  the 
earnings function estimates.  I’ While focusing on the estimated returns to years 
of  schooling,  these  studies generally  indicated  relatively  modest  impacts of 
variations in cognitive ability after holding constant the quantity of schooling. 
In this work, there was no real discussion of what led to any observed cognitive 
differences, although much of the work implicitly treated it as innate, and not 
very  related  to variations  in  schooling.’) Further, all of  this work  relied  on 
nonrepresentative samples of the population. 
The most recent  direct  investigations  of  cognitive  achievement,  however, 
have suggested generally larger labor market returns to measured  individual 
differences  in  cognitive  achievement.  For  example,  Bishop (1989,  1991), 
O’Neill(1990), Ferguson (1993), Grogger and Eide (1995), and Murnane, Wil- 
lett, and Levy (1994) all find that the earnings advantages to higher achieve- 
ment on standardized tests are quite substantial. These results are derived from 
quite different approaches. Bishop (1989) worries about the measurement er- 
rors that are inherent in most testing situations and demonstrates  that careful 
treatment of that problem has a dramatic effect on the estimated importance of 
9. A substantial part of the controversy relates to the implications for effectiveness of expendi- 
ture or resource policies, as discussed below. The contrasting view emphasizes measuring “qual- 
ity” by  the resources (i.e,, inputs) going into schooling. Most recent along this line is Card and 
Krueger 1992a; see also the review of the discussion in Burtless 1994. 
10. See. for example, Griliches 1974. 
I I. The appropriate measure of earnings ability generally has received little attention, and the 
empirical work has tended to use any standardized test measure that is available. Therefore, differ- 
ences in the results across studies may partially reflect the specific measure of ability employed. 
12. This limited impact of cognitive achievement was also central to a variety of direct analyses 
of  schooling such as Jencks et al. 1972 and Bowles and Gintis 1976. An exception to the generally 
modest relationship of  cognitive performance  and income is  the work  of Young  and Jamison 
(1974). Using a national sample of data on reading competence, they  find a strong influence of 
test scores on income for whites (but not blacks). This held in both recursive and simultaneous 
equations models of the joint determination of achievement and income. 
13. Manski (1993) represents more recent work with this same general thrust. He recasts the 
issue as a selection problem and considers how ability or quality interacts with earnings expecta- 
tions to determine continuation in schooling. Currently, however, no empirical work along these 
lines identifies the quantitative importance of selection or the interaction of school quality and 
earnings in such models. 66  Eric A. Hanushek 
test differences. O’Neill (1990), Ferguson (1993), Grogger and Eide (1995), 
and Bishop (1991), on the other hand,  simply rely upon more recent labor 
market data along with more representative sampling and suggest that the earn- 
ings advantage to measured skill differences is larger than that found in earlier 
time periods and in earlier studies (even without correcting for test reliability). 
Murnane, Willett, and Levy (1994), considering a comparison over time, dem- 
onstrate that the results of increased returns to measured skills hold regardless 
of  the  methodology  (i.e.,  whether  simple  analysis  or  error-corrected  esti- 
mation). 
The National Research Council study on employment tests (Hartigan and 
Wigdor 1989) also supports the view of a significant relationship of tests and 
employment outcomes, although the strength of the relationship appears some- 
what less strong than that in the direct earnings investigations. It considers the 
relationship between the General Aptitude Test Battery (GATB), the standard 
employment test of the Department of Labor, and job performance. Their syn- 
thesis of a wide number of studies suggests a systematic but somewhat modest 
relationship with correlations to performance on the order of .2 to .4. The anal- 
ysis also finds that the validity of these tests in predicting performance  has 
gone down over time. These results, being somewhat at odds with the recent 
studies, may simply reflect the specialized nature of GATB.I4  Specifically, the 
GATB may not be a good measure of the cognitive outcomes of schools and 
may not correspond well to standard measures of cognitive achievement. 
An additional part of the return to school quality comes through continua- 
tion in school. There is substantial evidence that students who do better  in 
school, either through grades or scores on standardized achievement tests, tend 
to go farther in school (see, e.g., Dugan  1976 and Manski and Wise 1983). 
Rivkin (1991) finds that variations in test scores capture a considerable propor- 
tion of the systematic variation in high school completion and in college con- 
tinuation. Indeed, Rivkin (1991) finds that test score differences fully explain 
black-white differences in schooling. Bishop (199 1) and Hanushek, Rivkin, 
and Taylor (  1995) find that individual achievement scores are highly correlated 
with school attendance. Behrman et al. (1994) find strong achievement effects 
on both continuation into college and quality of college; moreover, the effects 
are larger when proper account is taken of  the endogeneity of achievement. 
Hanushek and Pace (1999, using the High School and Beyond data, find that 
college completion is significantly related to higher test scores at the end of 
high school. 
I conclude from these diverse studies that variations in cognitive ability, as 
measured by standardized tests, are important in career success. Variation in 
measured cognitive ability is far from everything that is important, but it is 
significant in a statistical and quantitative sense. 
14. The GATB is a very old test that may not reflect changes in  the economy. It also suffers 
from some psychometric problems (see Hartigan and Wigdor  1989). The central purpose of  the 
study was assessment of the Department of Labor practice of providing test information normed 
to racial groups. 67  Rationalizing School Spending 
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The linkage of individual cognitive skills to aggregate productivity growth 
is much more difficult to establish. There is no clear consensus on the underly- 
ing causes of  improvements in the overall productivity of the U.S. economy, 
or on how the quality of workers interacts with economic growth.I5 
3.1.3  The Pattern of Quality Changes 
First warning of problems came when national average Scholastic Aptitude 
Test (SAT) scores fell from the mid-1960s through the end of the 1970~'~  As 
shown in figure 3.3, there has been some recovery, but it has been neither con- 
15. One observation is useful, however. When looking at the history of productivity increase in 
the U.S. economy, several distinct time periods stand out. Productivity growth continued at some 
2% per year through the  1960s, but fell off subsequently-first  to 1% in the 1970s and then to 
virtually 0 in the 1980s. Noting that productivity changes in these time periods mirror the aggre- 
gate pattern of scholastic test scores (shown below), some have gone on to presume that the test 
scores are driving the productivity changes.  Such could not, however, be the case-since,  as 
Bishop (1989) makes clear, the test takers with lower scores remained a small proportion of the 
total labor force through the 1980s. Lower test scores in the 1980s may signal forthcoming prob- 
lems, hut they cannot be an explanation for past changes in the economy. 
16. The SAT is subject to questioning because of the selective nature of test takers-essentially 
high school students who wish to go to a geographically and academically select group of schools. 
While some of the change in test scores can he attributed to changes in the test-taking population, 
it  is clear that  real performance  changes  are also  included. See Congressional Budget  Office 
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Fig. 3.4  Science achievement as measured by National Assessment of 
Educational Progress: seventeen-year-olds, 1970-1992 
Source: U.S. Department of Education 1993. 
sistent nor sufficient to return performance to its previous highs. If we compare 
the peak to the trough, we find that the average test taker in  1979 was per- 
forming at the 39th percentile in math and the 33d percentile in reading of the 
1963 test takers. While the declines in the college admission tests (SAT and 
American College Test [ACT])  were among the largest, other tests also showed 
very significant falls. 
Results from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) are 
particularly significant because these are the only tests that provide data for a 
sampling of  students that is statistically representative of the overall student 
population. These tests cover reading, mathematics, and science for a random 
selection of students of given ages. While there are some differences between 
different tests in the series, these data (which are summarized in figs. 3.4-3.6) 
suggest  that  the  performance  of  the  average  seventeen-year-old  student 
changed little between the early 1970s and 1992. While reading performance 
may be up slightly over the entire period, mathematics performance has shown 
no improvement, and science performance has slipped. (Note also that these 
tests were first employed after a substantial portion of the fall in SAT perfor- 
mance had already occurred, suggesting that performance stabilized at a lower 
level than that of the 1960s.) 
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Source: US.  Department of Education 1993. 
exams, two facts stand out. First, the black-white gap in performance has gen- 
erally been narrowing over time. Second, the gap remains unacceptably large. 
International comparisons provide a different perspective on student perfor- 
mance. The most telling of the several different testing projects that have been 
undertaken over the past three decades is the International Assessment of Edu- 
cational Progress (IAEP). The IAEP results come from science and mathemat- 
ics, subjects less affected by  possible language and cultural differences. They 
also use the general tests developed for U.S.  students, so any differences in 
curricular objectives or instructional approaches work in the Americans’ favor. 
American students scored near the bottom, and the gap is particularly large on 
more complex tasks (Lapointe, Mead, and Gary  1989). As the report on the 
first IAEP mathematics results notes, however, the students from the United 
States seemed unworried by their performance: “Despite their poor overall per- 
formance, about two-thirds of  the United  States’ thirteen-year-olds  feel that 
they are ‘good at mathematics.’ Only 23 percent of their Korean counterparts, 
the best achievers, share the same attitude” (Lapointe, Mead, and Gary 1989, 
10). A smaller and different group of countries participated in a follow-up to 
the IAEP in 1991 (U.S. Department of Education 1993). On this collection of 
tests, nine-year-old students from the United  States scored in  the middle of 
the range on the science examination and at the bottom on the mathematics 70  Eric A. Hanushek 
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Educational Progress: seventeen-year-olds,  1971-1992 
Source: U.S. Department of Education 1993. 
examination. By contrast, thirteen-year-old American students scored at the 
bottom  in both mathematics  and  science. The one examination showing  a 
somewhat different result is the 1991 Reading Literacy Study. U.S. fourteen- 
year-olds placed seventh out of nineteen international testing groups (U.S. De- 
partment of Education 1993). Unfortunately, no historical data exist on reading 
performance, so it is impossible to say anything about changes over time. 
Related to concerns about the performance of the average student are ques- 
tions concerning the performance of the very top students. Many suggest that 
the very highly skilled, for example, scientists and engineers, have a particu- 
larly important role in determining the viability of the economy and its future 
growth. Thus, a fall in the performance of the highest-performing  students- 
particularly  a disproportionate fall-might  have  especially adverse effects. 
While there are suggestions of a decline in top students, existing data and test- 
ing methodology make it very difficult to ascertain with confidence the extent 
of any such change. No evidence, however, indicates that performance of top 
students has impr0~ed.l~ 
17. See, for example, the discussion in Educational Testing Service  1991 and Congressional 
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3.1.4  Cost Considerations 
These results have not been for lack of trying.Is The United States has con- 
tinually increased the resources devoted to public schools throughout the twen- 
tieth century. By some measures, expenditure on education has grown faster 
than that on health over the past two decades. Yet while health care costs are the 
subject of vigorous debate, the unremitting growth in educational expenditures 
receives only passing  attention in most policy  discussions. More ironically, 
when attention is focused on educational expenditure, it is usually to suggest 
that spending should rise. But educational expenditure has risen strongly and 
steadily in real terms throughout the century. Some of the increase is a simple 
consequence of the increased numbers of school-age children, but a larger part 
reflects active policy choices to increase expenditure on the schooling of each 
student-through  more and higher-paid teachers, working in schools with a 
steadily declining pupil/teacher ratio. These increases are magnified by even 
larger increases in expenditure other than for instructional staff. 
Between 1890 and 1990, real public expenditure on elementary and second- 
ary education in the United States rose from $2 billion to almost $190 billion. 
(All monetary measures are adjusted by  the GNP deflator to constant  1990 
dollars; expenditure excludes capital costs.) This almost 100-fold increase was 
more than triple the growth rate of the GNP during the same period. Educa- 
tional expenditure increased from less than  1% of  the GNP in  1890 to over 
3.5% of the GNP in  1990. 
Spending on public schooling as a percentage of the GNP actually peaked 
in  1975, at almost 4%, when baby boomers reached their maximum school- 
going years. But demographics are only the lesser part of the story of rising 
educational spending. Rising per-student expenditure explains the bulk of the 
change in educational outlays. Figure 3.7 plots increases in per-student expen- 
diture from  1890 to 1990. Real, per-student expenditure rose from $164 in 
1890 to $772 in 1940, and on to $4,622 in 1990-roughly  quintupling in each 
fifty-year period. The figure also separates expenditure on instructional staff- 
mainly teachers and principals-from  other school expenditure. Today, expen- 
diture on instructional staff accounts for roughly 45% of total school spending. 
In 1940, by contrast, it accounted for about two-thirds. 
Three factors drive spending on instructional staff (which I frequently refer 
to simply as teachers). First is the absolute size of the school population, which 
is determined by the numbers of children of the relevant ages, by whether or 
not they are enrolled in school, and by their choices between public and private 
schools. Second are choices in the intensity of instruction-including  varying 
average class sizes and the length of  the school year, The third force driving 
instructional costs is wage rates and other personnel costs, most importantly 
18. This section summarizes the more detailed analysis of costs found in Hanushek and Riv- 
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$5 
1890  1900  1910  1920  1930  1940  1950  1960  1970  1980  1990  1890  1900  1910  1920  1930  1940  1950  1960  1970  1980  1990 
Year  Year 
Other Current Spending  1 
Fig. 3.7 
Source: Hanushek and Rivkin 1994. 
Real instructional staff and other current expenditure per student, 
1890-1990 
for teachers. Table 3.1 illustrates how these three separate forces have affected 
the growth in instructional-staff expenditure over the past century. 
Over the entire century from 1890 to 1990, 29.5% of the growth in instruc- 
tional-staff  spending was attributed to increases in public school population, 
with most of that coming from pure growth in the school-age population. An 
almost equal share came from a rise in the intensity of instruction, most nota- 
bly from declines in class sizes. Pupil/teacher ratios fell from 35 in  1890 to 25 
in  1960 to 15 in 1990.Iy  The remaining 42.6% of overall increases came from 
increases in the real wages of teachers. The aggregation across the full century, 
however, masks some very different periods. Specifically, 1970-90  exhibited 
19. Over the century, a portion of the fall in pupilkacher ratios can be attributed to a proportion- 
ate increase  in  the secondary  school population.  Secondary  schools have  maintained 20-25% 
lower pupillteacher ratios, at least during  the post-World  War  I1 period,  so an increase in the 
proportion of secondary students will imply a reduction in average class sizes even if no funda- 
mental changes occurred. At the same time pupiVteacher ratios within both elementary and sec- 
ondary  schools have continuously  fallen over the last fifty years. Overall private school pupill 
teacher ratios have been roughly equal to public school ratios, although part of this comes from 
aggregating over very heterogeneous situations. Private secondary schools have had lower pupil/ 
teacher ratios, while the opposite holds at the elementary school level. Further, there is a very 
different mix  of  elementary and secondary student populations  in private schools as compared 
to public. 73  Rationalizing School Spending 
Table 3.1  Changes in Instructional Staff Expenditure Attributed to Input 
Changes by Periods, 1890-1990  (percentage) 
1890-1940  1940-1970  1970-1990  1980-1990  1x90-I990 
Quantity 
School-age population  24  35.3  -36.1  -  16.9  23.3 
Enrollment rate  8  4  3  .0  11.8  6.0 
Public school enrollment  1.5  -  1.3  -2.1  -2.7  0.2 
PupiYteacher ratio  10.7  20.3  85.4  36.  I  20.8 
Days per year  12.7  I .4  0  0  7.2 
Price of teachers  43.1  40.3  49.9  71.6  42.6 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
Intensity 
Input cost 
Source: Hanushek and Rivkin 1994. 
Note: This table uses a multiplicative decomposition of  cost growth to attribute the overall in- 
creases in instructional costs to specific factors. See Hanushek and Rivken 1994. 
marked declines in the school-age population (the “baby bust”) with continued 
declines in pupil/teacher ratios and increases in teacher wages that exceeded 
those of the earlier periods. The net effect was the continued growth in per- 
pupil spending that was, in the aggregate, masked by a falling population. 
The pupilhexher ratio has declined steadily, regardless of whether the price 
of instructional personnel increased or decreased. While technological change 
has led to substitution of capital for labor elsewhere in the economy, the oppo- 
site has occurred  in education. One contributing factor in the decline in the 
average pupil/teacher ratio might be an increase in the number of difficult-to- 
educate children, such as handicapped children or children from low-income 
families. But the general nationwide decline in the pupillteacher ratio-which 
occurs across schools in communities with a wide variety of student popula- 
tions-suggests  that this is not the fundamental reason for change. Direct anal- 
ysis of the growth in the handicapped populations also indicates that this can 
explain considerably less than half of spending growth (Hanushek and Rivkin 
1  994). 
The growth in teacher salaries is also interesting. While wage increases have 
contributed significantly to the growth in school expenditure, teacher earnings 
have, at least  since World War 11,  slipped relative to earnings opportunities 
elsewhere in the economy. This unfortunate situation appears to reflect simply 
the low growth in productivity  of education  relative  to other sectors in the 
economy.2o  It is interesting, however, that schools (and, through bargaining, 
20. The general pressures toward increasing costs in low-productivity industries is set out in 
Scitovsky and Scitovsky 1959, Baumol and Bowen 1965, and Baumol 1967. The interpretation in 
the educational industry is more complicated, however, because educated labor is both an input 
and an output-implying  that the value of output is going up at the same time that input costs 
are rising. 74  Eric A. Hanushek 
teacher unions) have responded to cost pressures by accepting falling relative 
wages along with reduced pupiYteacher ratios. The pattern of wage changes is 
complicated and differs significantly for men and women, but increased alter- 
native work opportunities for women is likely to put added strain on schools 
in the future (see Hanushek and Rivkin 1994). 
Expenditure  other than on instructional  staff, the final component of cost 
growth, has had dramatic impacts on overall spending,  but interpreting changes 
is difficult. Other expenditure grows from $0.4 billion in  1890 to $6.4 billion 
in  1940 and to over $100 billion in  1990. As figure 3.7 shows, other expendi- 
ture has actually risen more rapidly over the entire century than instructional- 
staff  expenditure.  On average  since  1960, this  noninstructional-staff  expen- 
diture per student rises  at 5% per year, compared  to only  3% per year for 
instructional  expenditure.  The relative  growth  of  other expenditure  is  most 
rapid  during the decade of the  1970s, when the total  school-age population 
dropped significantly.21  If, for example, other expenditure  had grown at the 
same per-student  rate  as instructional-staff  expenditure  between  1960 and 
1990, the  1990 per-student  expenditure  would  have been  $3,480 instead of 
over $4,622. This would implicitly allow for increased noninstructional-staff 
spending intensity because the growth of instructional-staff expenditures in- 
cludes a fall in the pupilheacher ratio of a third. 
The attention that is given to other expenditure (outside of that for instruc- 
tional staff) flows in part from a common  interpretation that, if it does  not 
relate to instructional staff, it must be growth of administrative bureaucracy.22 
Unfortunately,  it is difficult  to tell exactly what changes  have occurred, let 
alone to judge the efficacy of any such changes. Little consistent data are avail- 
able to permit any detailed analysis of what lies behind this growth. Moreover, 
the data that do exist are somewhat misleading, since the other category actu- 
ally includes a variety of items that are conceptually part of instructional ex- 
penditure but are labeled noninstructional by accounting convention. For ex- 
ample, the “noninstructional” component includes employer-paid health care 
and retirement contributions for teachers. Other components left out of instruc- 
tional-staff spending include items like books and supplies, which are legiti- 
mately part of classroom instruction. Thus, the break between instructional and 
noninstructional expenditure is difficult to make. 
21. In terms of absolute growth rates, the decades of the 1950s and  1960s are the largest of the 
postwar period; this holds for both per capita expenditure and total current expenditure. During 
these decades, however, both instructional-staff and other expenditure were growing in parallel. 
During the 1970s, instructional-staff expenditure was constant in the aggregate and rose less than 
1% annually on a per-student basis, while other expenditure per student grew at an annual real 
growth rate of 5.6%. 
22. For example, former Secretary of Education William J. Bennett writes: “Too much money 
has been diverted from the classroom; a smaller share of the school dollar is now being spent on 
student classroom instruction than at any time in recent history. . . .  It should be a basic goal of the 
education reform movement to reverse this trend toward administrative bloat and to reduce the 
scale of the bureaucratic ‘blob’ draining our school resources” (1988.46). 75  Rationalizing School Spending 
3.1.5  Uncertainty about School Performance 
The aggregate  data  motivate  a concern  about the performance  of  public 
schools. Nevertheless,  they are inconclusive, because they reflect factors that 
go beyond just the core activities of the schools. 
First, achievement is affected by  a variety of  influences, not just schools. 
Parents, friends, and others outside of the school all contribute to a student’s 
achievement, so that the aggregate scores do not simply reflect what is happen- 
ing over time in the schools. Moreover, the aggregate character of these outside 
factors has clearly been changing through time. It is natural to point to such 
things as the upsurge in immigrant populations, the increase in child poverty, 
and the tilt toward single-parent families as adversely affecting the preparation 
of  students for school and the support they receive for obtaining high perfor- 
mance. But even the aggregate story is complicated and difficult to sort out by 
simple consideration of trend data. Offsetting favorable factors for education 
include the increased education of parents, the movement toward smaller fami- 
lies, and the increase in government interventions such as Head Start that are 
aimed at compensating for poorer family support. The net impact of these and 
similar factors is difficult to infer from the aggregate (see also Congressional 
Budget Office 1987). 
Second, on the expenditure  side, there also may be interpretive problems. 
Not all expenditure is aimed at improving performance in core areas. Thus, for 
example,  expansion  of  the  social agenda  of  schools undoubtedly  takes  re- 
sources but contributes little to the improvement of science ability of students 
(see Committee for Economic  Development  1994). Similarly,  as mentioned 
before, expenditures on handicapped children are unlikely to have much im- 
pact  on average  achievement  scores, in part because  such  students are fre- 
quently excluded from routine testing. Additionally, performance at each point 
in time should be related to the cumulative past expenditure contributing to a 
cohort’s schooling. The generally  smooth nature of increases, however, sug- 
gests that such timing issues are not particularly important. 
The import of all of these issues is to introduce caution in the interpretation 
of  aggregate performance  data. While the overall level of performance  is a 
clear concern, the consideration of the role of schools and school policy re- 
quires further analysis. Importantly, however, more detailed consideration of 
the circumstances behind the aggregate data does not change the overall pic- 
ture and conclusions to be drawn. The key finding of more direct evidence on 
school performance, described below, is that schools have a performance prob- 
lem that has not been solved by increased resources for schools. 
3.2  Conventional Policy Interpretations 
This lengthy review of the data and the state of education  in  the United 
States is really meant as a preamble to the main thesis of  this paper. Specifi- 76  Eric A. Hanushek 
cally, much of the debate and policy  discussion  appears based on a flawed 
understanding of the data that is compounded by translating observations about 
quantity of schooling into policy statements about quality of schooling. First, 
based on extensive evidence that increasing school attainment has had power- 
ful effects on individual earnings and aggregate economic performance, many 
quite naturally argue for an expansion of schooling. Expanding schooling with 
a  relatively  constant  level  of  school  attainment  implies  devoting more  re- 
sources to schools and, in effect, increasing the intensity of the resources pro- 
vided to a fixed pool of students. This translation, as described in section 3.2.1, 
on improving quality, is unlikely, however, to yield the economic benefits pre- 
sumed. Second, pursuing the objective of increased equity falls prey to similar 
problems. Equity is viewed in two somewhat different ways: in terms of race 
or income and in terms of geographic variation in school spending. Both begin 
with a concern about quality differences but then tend to confuse such con- 
cerns with very imperfect measurement of quality differences among schools. 
Third, while less central to much of the current policy debate, the notion that 
education is a “high externality” area provides a backdrop for many arguments 
aimed at changing the quality of schooling, but little evidence relates to this 
at all. 
The unifying feature of these perspectives on school policy is the pressure 
generated for increased spending on schools. Each revolves around a plausible 
sounding  and  widely  accepted  argument  for  increased  public  support  of 
schools. And  each incorrectly  applies evidence about returns to quantity  of 
schooling to support expenditure expansion. 
This paper does not, however, “test” its main thesis. Instead, it lays out the 
ideas as a way of organizing thinking about much of the current educational 
debate. As such, it tries to rationalize the existing evidence and the existing 
rhetoric. 
3.2.1  Improving Quality through Expanding Resources 
The most common policy proposal for dealing with the performance prob- 
lems of schools described previously is to expand the resources available for 
schools.*’ Such proposals tend to ignore the aggregate data presented above 
that indicate a steady expansion of resources before and during the period of 
concern  about lagging  school performance.  A common justification  for in- 
creased resources is estimates of high rates of return to schooling investments, 
but these estimates of high rates of return rely almost exclusively on character- 
izations of earnings improvements from quantity of schooling. As is obvious, 
increasing spending on schools without a commensurate improvement in stu- 
23. An example, typical of the large number of reform proposals appearing in the past decade, 
is the Committee for Economic Development (1985) statement appearing in bold on page 4, “We 
believe that any call for comprehensive improvement in the public schools that does not recognize 
the need for additional resources is destined for failure.” Interestingly, Committee for Economic 
Development  1994 takes a very different tack, arguing that management and governance issues 
are much more important than additional resources if our schools are to improve. 77  Rationalizing School Spending 
dent performance will  only  decrease the rate  of  return  on schooling (even 
though  common methods of  calculating rates  of  return  will  frequently not 
show such true effects). 
The aggregate data on spending and performance are suggestive but far from 
conclusive,  because,  as mentioned,  many  other  factors  enter  into  overall 
changes in student outcomes over time. Much more persuasive is the evidence 
from a large number of detailed econometric studies of the determinants of 
student achievement. The econometric evidence comes from various estimates 
of  the effects of  either spending or real  resources on  student performance 
(holding constant student family background and other characteristics). These 
studies, initiated in response to the “Coleman Report” (Coleman el al. 1966), 
are designed to separate the various influences on student performance. The 
basic  summary  table  of  econometric  results,  reproduced  from  Hanushek 
(1989), is found in appendix table 3A.  1. This table summarizes the sign of 
estimated coefficients for the effects of major school resources and their statis- 
tical significance. The primary determinants of  variations in expenditure per 
students across classrooms and schools are teacher education and teacher expe- 
rience-which  determine teacher salaries-and  pupil/teacher ratios-which 
determine over how many pupils the teacher’s salary is spread. There is little 
confidence of any consistent resource effects related to these factors, based on 
conventional  statistical  standards,  and  many  studies  even  suggest  that  in- 
creased resources are associated with decreased student perf~rmance.~~ 
This evidence makes it clear that there is no systematic and consistent rela- 
tionship between school resources and student performance.2s  These findings 
are categorized under efficiency simply because they imply that increased re- 
sources are associated with no gains in outcomes, an obvious case of economic 
inefficiency. The research does not imply that resources never could or do im- 
prove performance, just that they currently do not.2h  Most policy appeals for 
expanding school resources do not offer any substantial change in the organi- 
24. Expenditure effects are best viewed in terms of real resource differences that vary across 
classrooms and schools, that is, class sizes, teacher-education levels and teacher-experience levels. 
A limited number of studies directly investigate measured expenditure per pupil. Since such mea- 
sures are generally available only at the school district level, studies employing such measures 
tend to be highly aggregated and less reliable. See Hanushek 1986, 1989, 1994b. A reanalysis of 
the expenditure  data can be found in Hedges, Laine, and Greenwald  1994, which  attempts to 
conduct formal statistical tests combining the estimated coefficients of expenditures. As reviewed 
in Hanushek 1994a, 1994b, there is agreement that some schools employ resources effectively, but 
this does not support any broad resource-centered policies. 
25. The basic articles (Hanushek 1986, 1989)  provide information about the underlying studies. 
While a few studies were missed, this analysis attempted to include an exhaustive set of underlying 
estimates that met minimal criteria (published studies that included both resource and family back- 
ground  measures  and  that  reported  sign  and  significance of  estimated  effects).  About  three- 
quarters of the  187 studies included employ standardized test scores as the measure of student 
performance, while the remainder include such things as subsequent incomes, college continua- 
tion, or school dropout behavior. 
26. The recent exchange on the statistical nature of the evidence (Hedges, Laine, and Greenwald 
1994; Hanushek  1994a) underscores  agreement  that some schools appear currently to use  re- 
sources effectively, while a counterbalancing set does not. 78  Eric A. Hanushek 
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zation and incentives of schools, and thus the available evidence on past lack 
of success appears relevant for these appeals. 
The general situation is best illustrated in figure 3.8. Society's resources can 
be devoted either to producing more human capital or to any other (public or 
private)  good.  The frontier  traces  the  maximum  consumption  of  all  other 
goods, given the level of human capital chosen. But inefficient use of resources 
in education places us somewhere inside this possibilities curve. Pure resource 
or spending policies, of the type frequently proposed and pursued, appear by 
the evidence to lead to additional inefficiency instead of added human capital 
production. Thus, they tend to drive resource allocation in the direction of A. 
On the other hand, since elimination of  existing inefficiencies can improve the 
amount of human capital produced without expanding additional resources, 
policies moving us in the direction B should be the focus of attention. The 
debate  about  interpretation  of  existing  evidence  (Hedges,  Laine,  and 
Greenwald  1994 and Hanushek  1994a) can be interpreted simply as a debate 
about whether spending policies might not be purely vertical but instead might 
move us slightly to the right as depicted by  the dashed  line moving  in the 
direction A'. Even if  movement  toward A' could be achieved, such policies 
would remain very inferior to policies pushing toward B. 79  Rationalizing School Spending 
One way some view this evidence is that varying levels of resources  may 
have powerful effects at low levels of investment, but, given the current amount 
spent on U.S.  schools, there is no obvious impact. Such an interpretation  is 
consistent  with evidence that minimal levels of resources have important ef- 
fects in promoting quality  in the schools of developing  countries (see, e.g., 
Harbison and Hanushek 1992). It may also help reconcile the findings of Card 
and Krueger (1992a) with those presented here, because their study finds sig- 
nificant resource impacts on earnings when variations across pre-World  War 
I1 schools are con~idered.~’  None of this evidence suggests, however, that one 
should expect significant differences in student performance to follow expan- 
sion of school resources from current levels and within the current incentive 
structure.28  Similar to what has been suggested for medical care, we may sim- 
ply be on the flat of the performance curve, where added resources yield little 
marginal payoff. 
Arguing simply that schooling, broadly defined, is a high-return investment 
does not  provide  adequate justification  for increased  direct expenditure on 
schools. The arguments of  investments to improve quality must consider the 
nature  of  the  investment in  ways that  arguments to expand the quantity of 
schooling usually do not. This confusion over returns to quantity and quality 
and over the kinds of investment to be undertaken has, in my opinion, quite 
distorted the educational policy debate. 
3.2.2  Equity 
Another thrust of the general consideration  of educational  policy concen- 
trates on equity matters-the  distribution of outcomes by identifiable charac- 
teristics. The historical review of schooling highlighted some of the concerns. 
First, the gap in measured performance by race and ethnic background is very 
large. Second, although not discussed, the gap in achievement by parents’ edu- 
cation, income,  and social status is likewise  large. Together, these observed 
outcome differences  (and  the income and employment ramifications)  have 
formed the basis for a large amount of the attention to schools serving disad- 
vantaged groups. 
But the educational policy debate has concentrated more on a different eq- 
uity concern-that  of differential spending across local school districts. Since 
the first decisions in the landmark school finance case of Serruno v. Priest in 
the  late  1960s. attention  has focused on the structure of  local  and  state fi- 
27. Significant controversy over the findings of Card and Krueger (1992a) and their relevance 
for current schools remains and is unresolved; see Burtless 1994 and other papers presented at the 
Brookings conference “Do School Resources Matter?” (Washington, DC, June 6,  1994). Reestim- 
ation of the basic earnings relationships by Heckman, Layne-Famar, and Todd (1994) also suggests 
that the original estimates of Card and Krueger are very sensitive to sample and model specifica- 
tion and that the resource effects are weakened or disappear in alternative estimates. 
28. An alternative set of incentives-ones  emphasizing student performance-may  well be able 
to change this situation. These arguments, nonetheless, go well beyond the scope of this paper. 
The evidence on performance effects is also very limited today. See Hanushek with others 1994. 80  Eric A. Hanushek 
nan~e.~~  The simple argument that now has been repeated  in over half of the 
states is that local schools supported by local property taxes are inequitable 
because they make the quality of school provision dependent on the “wealth 
of one’s neighbors.”  Decisions in these state cases have depended on specific 
state circumstances and the separate state constitutions. But there is no doubt 
that they have been popular in large part because supporters of the suits and 
judges in  the cases view  them as addressing  the more general  equity con- 
cerns-differential  outcomes by race and income.’O  The attention given to Jon- 
athan Kozol’s recent book (199  1) provides some evidence on that score. His 
book provides a vivid description of the contrast between the country’s very 
best and very worst schools. He then suggests that bringing all schools up to 
the funding of the wealthiest will eliminate the racial and income disparities 
in student performance and lifetime success, a position that simply is not sup- 
ported by the evidence. Nevertheless, this book has been featured in the popu- 
lar press and is widely quoted as illustrating both the existing equity problems 
and the obvious solutions. 
Various aspects of local inefficiencies, tax equity, interjurisdictional mobil- 
ity, sorting  by preferences  a la Tiebout,  and the like immediately  spring  to 
mind when local property taxes and different tax bases are discussed. But the 
educational equity aspects are less clear. In simplest terms, if the distribution 
of funding does not relate to the quality of schools, the equity aspects of the 
school financing debates and court cases that focus on spending variations are 
significantly less clear. 
One part of the evidence and the debate needs clarifying at this point. As a 
general matter, it is important to recognize that schools are but one input to a 
student’s learning and achievement. The student’s own ability and motivation, 
the education from parents and families, and the input of  community and 
friends each contrib~tes.~~  The common observation that students in wealthy 
suburban areas who attend  high-spending  schools do well  on standardized 
achievement tests frequently sends the message that duplicating those schools 
in poor areas will equalize achievement. In fact, the previous evidence (from 
econometric analysis that standardizes for parental inputs and, sometimes, in- 
dividual  ability  differences) indicates these conclusions are wrong on two 
counts. First,  one should  not simply equate high  student  achievement  with 
well-functioning schools, because the high achievement frequently just implies 
strong parental  influences.  Second, providing  equal resources  is unlikely  to 
29. Following a 1974 ruling in Rodriguez v. San Antonio, these school finance issues have been 
a matter of strictly state concern, and the federal government has not been involved. 
30. It is generally presumed that places with low tax bases are the ones with most of the popula- 
tion of poor children. This presumption, however, is far from true, in large part because of  the 
powerful influence of the distribution of  commercial and industrial property on the size of  the 
local tax base but also because of the substantial variation in incomes within most communities. 
3 1. This discussion takes the general view that family inputs are very important but are not very 
manipulable from a policy viewpoint. This position probably understates some possibilities. See, 
for example, Fuchs and Reklis  1994 on the importance of readiness for school, which might be 
affected by policy interventions. 81  Rationalizing School Spending 
close gaps, given that  schools  do not consistently employ resources effec- 
ti~ely.~* 
Most recently, these financing cases have gone one step further by introduc- 
ing the concept of “adequacy.” In one form, adequacy is simply an appeal for 
more resources. Even if a state’s funding shows little variation, so the argument 
goes, the level of funding may be inadequate to provide high-quality schools. 
Such an argument was employed, for example, in a 1992 school-finance suit 
in Alabama where very little variation in spending was matched with a ranking 
of forty-seventh among the states in average expenditure in  1991.33  Yet  the 
evidence presented previously  indicates that simple expansion of school re- 
sources is unlikely to yield much overall improvement in student performance, 
even though the state could clearly move up in national spending ran king^.^^ A 
second, and somewhat more appealing, version of adequacy is that sufficient 
funding should be provided to ensure that all students can perform at an accept- 
able level. This version is more appealing because it focuses attention on stu- 
dent performance, but it is no more practical, regardless of one’s views about 
appropriate social goals for equity. Its impracticality derives from an inability 
to specify how added resources translate into better achievement. 
The primary message is that equity concerns cannot be separated from effi- 
ciency. If there is no direct way to transform resources into improved student 
performance, policies aimed at more equity through equalizing resources have 
little hope of improving equity as defined in terms of student outcomes. Poli- 
cies of redistribution are not neutral, however, because seldom is there a simple 
change in existing funding patterns when increased equality of  spending is 
sought. Instead of moving funds from high-spending districts to low-spending 
districts, changes invariably involve expansion of total spending-that  is, it is 
easier to redistribute a larger pie. Thus, equity-inspired policies are probably 
best thought of in terms of their other potential purposes or effects-whether 
that is increasing the overall level of spending, moving toward more equal tax 
rates across jurisdictions, or whatever. 
3.2.3  Externalities 
A final area where policy rhetoric and evidence seem at odds involves the 
extent of externalities in education. In general, activities that are perceived to 
have significant externalities are prime candidates for increased governmental 
32. The overall trends toward convergence of black and white test scores have led some to infer 
that increased compensatory spending on schools has finally begun to be seen. This conclusion is 
not, however, the result of explicit analysis, and it ignores other trends such as increased education 
of black parents, declining family sizes, and (going in the other direction) increased illegitimacy 
rates and stagnant incomes. Direct analyses of the effectiveness of compensatory programs does 
not support this as an explanation (see Mullin and Summers 1983). 
33. Wyckoff (1992) provides comparative inequality measures for all states in 1987. Only four 
states (excluding Hawaii with its unified school system) had a lower coefficient of variation in 
current expenditure per pupil than Alabama. Spending by  state is found in U.S. Bureau of the 
Census 1993. 
34. See the description of projected achievement effects in Hanushek 1993. 82  Eric A. Hanushek 
support. As is also well-recognized,  externalities are noticeably  elusive, and, 
while  optimal tax  and  subsidy policies  in the  face of externalities  are well 
understood conceptually, few estimates of the magnitude of externalities exist 
anywhere. Nevertheless, if economists were polled on externalities  in educa- 
tion,  I  suspect that they would substantially support the view that education 
involves extensive externalities. 
As described previously,  leading candidates for areas of external benefits 
involve citizen involvement in the community and government, crime reduc- 
tion,  family decision  making  and child  upbringing,  and  economic growth. 
There is evidence that more schooling does have a positive impact in each of 
these areas. But what does that imply for the current debates? 
In each area, a significant portion of the beneficial effect of education ap- 
pears to come from comparing very low levels of school attainment with sig- 
nificantly  higher levels. Thus, extensive discussions of the social benefits of 
schooling in developing countries would seem both warranted and correct.35  It 
is difficult to have, for example, a well-informed  citizenry when most of the 
population is illiterate. It may also be difficult to introduce advanced produc- 
tion technologies, at least in a timely manner, if workers cannot be expected to 
read the accompanying technical manuals. 
On the other hand, even if accepting the importance of externalities at mini- 
mal levels, there is little reason to believe that there are constant marginal ex- 
ternalitie~.~~  Specifically, arguments about the social benefits of expanded edu- 
cation seem much stronger in the case of developing countries of Africa than 
in the case of the United States during the twenty-first  century, Where half of 
the population  has attended  some postsecondary  schooling,  another year  of 
average schooling seems unlikely to change dramatically the political aware- 
ness of the U.S. population. Similarly, if the average high school student scores 
950 on the SAT instead of 900, I do not think many would expect noticeable 
changes in the identified extra social benefits of education. 
My leading candidate for potential externalities of education in the United 
States and other developed countries would revolve around economic growth. 
If a highly skilled workforce permits entirely different kinds of technologies 
to be introduced, or to be introduced earlier in a development cycle, expanded 
education of an individual may indeed affect other workers in the economy. 
35. Interestingly, policy discussions of education in developing countries tend to concentrate 
most on private rates of return and the market advantages of schooling, even though they make 
some reference to other social benefits such as political participation and lower fertility. See, for 
example, Heyneman and White 1986; Psacharopoulos, Tan, and Jimenez 1986; and Lockheed and 
Verspoor 1991. 
36. This issue is raised by Friedman  1962 and remains for the most part in  the discussions of 
college education in Hartman 1973 and Mundel 1973. None of these, however, provides empirical 
evidence on the existence or magnitude of any externalities. The early primer on externalities in 
education (Weisbrod 1964) concentrates chiefly on geographic spillovers and fiscal effects and 
downplays the issues raised here. A discussion of the magnitude of externalities that is similar to 
the one here is found in Poterba (chap. 10 in this volume). 83  Rationalizing School Spending 
Or, if improved abilities of the best students leads to more rapid invention and 
development of new technologies,  spillovers of educational investments may 
result. Nevertheless, I know of little evidence that distinguishes externalities in 
economic growth from simply the impact of better workers and more human 
capital. 
The consideration of externalities ties into the previous discussion by offer- 
ing another argument for the expansion  of resources devoted to schools that 
appears to me to come from inappropriate application of evidence. While ex- 
ternalities may support expansion of schools to provide basic literacy and nu- 
meracy, their application in the case of  college education or of providing more 
resources to improve student quality is stretched. 
3.3  What Supports Spending? 
The motivation behind public spending on schools still remains mysterious. 
What determines increases  in spending, and, specifically,  is spending at all 
related to a school’s performance? Here we provide a preliminary look at citi- 
zen decisions on school budgets in New York State. 
New York State requires citizen approval of school budgets for a majority 
of school districts in the state.37  This analysis builds on voter reactions to pro- 
posed school budgets?  It combines votes on school budgets with information 
about the district’s students and parents and about student performance.  The 
focus of this analysis is the percentage favoring the initial budget proposal of 
each district. The models estimated consider income and other characteristics 
of the population, the impact on current tax rates and the history of tax rates, 
and alternative measures of student test performance. 
The models are meant to characterize the various influences on voter prefer- 
ences for spending. Since school systems do not readily provide information 
on performance, even  though  there  is mandatory  student  testing  at various 
grades in New York State, alternative formulations of information  employed 
by voters  are tested. Specifically, one measure of student performance is the 
change in reading and math passing percentages from third grade in 1987-88 
to sixth grade in  1990-91.  This measure is designed to proxy value-added of 
schools, since these are the same cohort of students. The second measure is 
the simple percentage achieving  passing  scores on sixth-grade  reading  and 
math tests. Neither is perfect as a measure of school system performance. The 
37. The “big five” districts (New York  City, Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, and Yonkers) are 
dependent districts getting their budgets from the city government and are excluded from require- 
ments for voter approval. Another group of  fifty cities (a historical definition that does not uni- 
formly include the next largest jurisdictions) are also excluded. Over five hundred districts remain 
with annual voting on proposed budgets. 
38. This analysis considers only the first vote for a school budget. By New York law, cornmuni- 
ties can have subsequent votes (on budget proposals that are the same, higher, or lower than the 
initially rejected budget) after a budget is rejected. Further, districts can operate under a “contin- 
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first is error-prone because of intervening student mobility, while the second 
mixes school effects with the effects of  family and peers. But the object is 
understanding how citizens might use available information to  assess perfor- 
mance of their schools, and each of these measures plausibly conditions voters' 
views on the performance of their schools. 
Table 3.2 presents two alternative models of  the determinants of  voter ap- 
Table 3.2  Explanations of Voter Approval of School Budgets for 550 New York 
State School Districts, 1991-1992  (&statistics  in parentheses) 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: Proportion Yes" 
Value-  Added  Level of 
Achievement  Achievement 
Proportion teachers 
Public school enrollment (white)' 
Elderlyd 
Median income ($1  ,OOO)" 
Tax-rate growth (1988-90)' 
Requested tax-rate increaseg 
A reading score (grades 3-6)h 
A math score (grades 3-6)' 
Reading score (grade 6) 
















-0.416  x 10-3 
-0.853  X 
(-0.4) 





















-.I07  X  10-~* 
"Proportion of  voters favoring proposed school budget. 
bProportion of  families in school district with a teacher. 
'Proportion of  white students attending public schools. 
dProportion  of  persons age sixty or more. 
"Median household income 1989. 
'Change in local revenues/property tax base between 1988 and 1990. 
gProposed change in local revenuedproperty tax base. 
hPercentage  of  sixth graders passing reading test (1990-91)  minus percentage of  third graders 
passing reading test (1987-88). 
'Percentage  of sixth graders passing math test (1  990-91) minus percentage of third graders passing 
math test (1987-88). 
'Percentage of sixth graders passing reading test (1990-91). 
kPercentage  of  sixth graders passing math test (1990-91). 85  Rationalizing School Spending 
proval, differing only by the measure of student performance.  The estimated 
effects are very consistent  across  the different versions,  since voters do not 
seem to react to either of the measures of performance.  The primary result is 
clear: neither estimated value-added nor the level of performance is systemati- 
cally related to voter approval of budgets. 
The models do not explain much of the variation in voter approval with R2’s 
of only .06. Nonetheless,  a number of systematic  effects do come through. 
Higher-income communities are more supportive of proposed budgets, as are 
communities with a greater proportion of elderly (population over age sixty). 
Communities with proportionately more teachers residing in them also tend to 
support proposed budgets.  While less  precisely  estimated, voters  also vote 
against larger tax increases in the proposed budget and are less supportive of 
current budgets if there has been larger past growth. 
These preliminary  estimates are subject to various statistical and method- 
ological concerns.39 Nonetheless,  the lack of relationship  between voter  ap- 
proval of expenditure and student performance raises serious questions about 
what does drive spending and citizen demands for school spending. Knowl- 
edge of citizen preferences is a key element in understanding the likely course 
of school spending. 
I do believe that these results bode continued difficulty for improved politi- 
cal decision making in education. One interpretation of the results is that voters 
are quite in the dark about which schools are performing well and which are 
providing a good return on resource investments. An alternative is that parents 
in fact know well what their schools are doing and are simply less concerned 
about student cognitive achievement than other things. Either way  one has to 
be concerned about prospects for “high-return” investments-those  that most 
directly improve the skills of students and that provide most of the justification 
for public support of the schools. 
3.4  Some Concluding Thoughts 
The underlying story is that problems of  inefficiency  in the provision  of 
education pervade most discussions. As soon as concern moves  away from 
simple quantity of schooling, as it invariably does today in the United States, 
it is not possible to neglect how resources  are transformed into student out- 
comes. Yet because of the difficulty of this and because of uncertainties about 
the production process, this step is frequently not taken. Instead, inappropriate 
use  is often made of  general conclusions about investments  in quantity of 
schooling to justify spending programs aimed at quality. 
Two outcomes flow from this. First, the policy debates, the court delibera- 
39. One important issue is the  low  turnout for school-budget votes. This low, and certainly 
selective, turnout leads to concerns about measurement errors. Additionally, this analysis employs 
a limited range of test scores (in terms of  both grade level and subject matter). 86  Eric A. Hanushek 
tions, and the related academic analyses all tend to founder on conflicting as- 
sumptions about how to achieve specific goals. In other words, even if every- 
body could agree completely about objectives, real controversy about strategy 
typically remains.  Second, the controversy appears to be frequently resolved 
in favor of increased expenditure on schools. The goals and objectives-in- 
creased performance and greater equity-are  legitimate and worthy  of sup- 
port, and there is a surface plausibility to dealing with these with greater re- 
sources. The history  of  spending and  performance indicates  disappointing 
results. 
It is difficult for economists to think about areas that are marked by  im- 
portant inefficiencies of the kind described here. Economists have found no- 
tions of efficiency to be very useful, convenient, and frequently plausible.  If 
efficiency reigns,  spending levels provide a ready measure of opportunities, 
variations in spending speak to equity concerns, and policy can be developed 
directly in terms of resources devoted to the area. Each disappears with sub- 
stantial inefficiency. 
On the other hand, it should not really surprise economists or others to find 
substantial inefficiency in the delivery of schooling. Even though there are very 
large differences among schools and teachers, successful schools and teachers 
receive essentially the same rewards as unsuccessful ones. Areas of economic 
activity where efficient provision occurs generally involve more direct and ob- 
vious incentives for performance.  With few incentives related  to school out- 
comes, inefficiency should not be totally unexpected. 
Setting out the alternative ways to address performance and equity concerns 
is beyond the scope of this paper. The most plausible approach, however, seems 
to be application of quite straightforward economic principles: align incentives 
with goals and evaluate alternative ways of achieving goals. These ideas, de- 
scribed in detail elsewhere (Hanushek with others 1994),  provide ways of deal- 
ing with the cost and performance difficulties in today’s schools. The important 
point for this discussion is that improving schools calls for radically different 
policies than the traditional  approach of simply throwing money at schools. 
Ultimately arriving at the proper level of investment in schools-a  level that 
best meets our achievement  and equity goals-may  cost more or less than 
what we are currently spending. We simply do not know the answer, given the 
current organization and performance of the schools. 
There is every reason to believe that investment in education is a good one, 
yielding high returns to individuals and to society. Substantial evidence also 
supports using quality education as a useful tool in altering income distribu- 
tions and achieving general equity goals of society. The central message here 
is simply that not every investment is equal. There are good and bad invest- 
ments in education. Much of recent policy has pushed  toward generally bad 
investments-those  that increase costs without any substantial benefits. Little 
evidence suggests that the primary problem facing schools has been lack of 
resources, and we should not treat that as the central issue. 87  Rationalizing School Spending 
Appendix 
Hanushek 1989 summarizes available published econometric evidence through 
1988. The selection of studies is described in that article. Subsequent reanaly- 
ses and consideration  of  the interpretation  of these results can be found in 
Hedges, Laine, and Greenwald 1994 and Hanushek 1994a, 1994b. 
Table 3A.1  Summary of the Estimated Relationship between Student 




Significant  Statistically Insignificant 
Number of  ~ 
Studies  +  -  Total  +  -  Unknown 
Teacher/pupil  152  14  13  125  34  46  45 
Teacher education  I13  8  5  100  31  32  37 
Teacher experience  I40  40  10  90  44  31  15 
Teacher salary  69  I1  4  54  16  14  24 
Administrative input  61  I  I  53  14  15  24 
Facilities  14  75  62  17  14  31 
Expenditure/pupil  65  13  3  49  25  13  I1 
Source: Hanushek 1989. 
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Comment  Christopher Jencks 
Hanushek’s provocative  paper asks why  educational spending has risen  so 
much in recent decades. His analysis starts with two factual premises. First, 
individuals who invest in additional  years of schooling obtain quite high re- 
turns on their investment, and these  returns  have risen  since 1980. Second, 
when the government spends more on elementary or secondary education, the 
return is now close to zero. 
Let me begin by recasting these propositions in slightly different terms. In- 
vestment mainly involves commitments of time to activities that pay off in the 
relatively distant future. What Hanushek calls the “quantity” of schooling is, 
in essence, the amount of time that students invest in their own education.’ Per- 
Christopher  Jencks is the John D. MacArthur Professor of  Sociology at Northwestern  Uni- 
versity. 
I. Hanushek’s measure of  “quantity” is actually the highest grade of  school or college that an 
individual completed. This measure weights each student’s investment of time by the average num- 
ber of grades that the student completed per year. But since most students complete exactly one 
grade per year, this measure weights most students’ time equally. 92  Eric A. Hanushek 
pupil  expenditure, in contrast,  measures  the amount of  the time that adults 
invest in the average student’s education, with each adult’s time weighted by 
its monetary value. Hanushek’s conclusions  can therefore be restated as fol- 
lows: (1) The amount of time students invest in their own education has a big 
effect on their subsequent earnings. (2) The amount of time adults invest in a 
student’s education has very little effect on anything. 
Hanushek’s main goal is to explain why per-pupil expenditure in public ele- 
mentary and secondary schools keeps rising even though the rate of return is 
negligible. The easy answer is that neither parents nor voters believe the returns 
are negligible. Many parents are willing to pay higher taxes in order to live in 
school districts that spend a lot on their schools. Even voters whose children 
are not in school often support increases in school spending, because they see 
such spending as an investment in the whole country’s future. Hanushek be- 
lieves that this faith is misplaced. I do not find the evidence he presents  as 
persuasive as he does, but he may be right anyway. 
Test Scores and Expenditures 
Until  1966, almost all Americans assumed that higher school spending led 
to greater mastery of the subjects taught in school. Then James Coleman and 
his  colleagues published  Equality  of  Educational  Opportunity,  commonly 
known as the Coleman Report, which found little relationship between school 
spending and student achievement. Most social scientists eventually accepted 
this counterintuitive conclusion, but few parents or educators concurred. In the 
past couple of years new evidence has appeared, which suggests that the pub- 
lic’s skepticism about social science may have been well founded. To  see why 
this might be the case, the reader should look closely at Hanushek’s appendix. 
Hanushek found thirty-eight published studies in which per-pupil expendi- 
ture had positive effects on student outcomes and sixteen in which it had nega- 
tive effects. In two-thirds of these studies the 95% confidence interval for the 
coefficient of per-pupil expenditure included zero, making the coefficient in- 
significant by traditional standards. But the fact that a confidence interval in- 
cludes zero does not prove that the true value really is zero. If the true effect 
of expenditures were zero, negative point estimates should be as common as 
positive ones. In reality, 70%  of the point  estimates are positive. If the true 
effect were zero, moreover, 95% of the confidence intervals  should include 
zero. In reality, only two-thirds of them include zero. 
Given the preponderance of positive point estimates, the most plausible in- 
ference from Hanushek’s appendix is that expenditures have a modest positive 
effect. If the true correlation  between  spending and achievement  is low but 
positive, and if most studies cover relatively small samples of schools or school 
districts, one would not expect most of the observed coefficients to be signifi- 
cant by conventional standards. 
The best way to summarize a literature of this kind is not to count the num- 
ber of significant coefficients but to compute the mean effect across all studies, 
regardless of their significance. Hedges, Laine, and Greenwald (1994) reana- 93  Rationalizing School Spending 
lyzed Hanushek’s data using this approach. Averaging  across all the studies 
that Hanushek had reviewed, they found that the coefficient of per-pupil ex- 
penditure was very large and highly significant. Indeed, the average effect was 
so large as to make the results seem quite implausible. Hanushek concludes 
from this  that their analysis was flawed. I conclude that the underlying data 
are biased. 
One likely source of bias is that Hanushek looks only at published studies. 
That may seem like a reasonable form of quality control, but many literature 
reviews  have found that the effects reported in published  studies tend to be 
larger than those reported in unpublished studies. This difference presumably 
reflects the fact that scholarly journals are more likely to publish studies that 
report significant effects. But for this bias to explain the entire surplus of sig- 
nificant coefficients in Hanushek’s sample, we have to assume that only one 
study in six gets published. That seems unlikely. 
A second and more fundamental problem is that the studies in Hanushek’s 
sample are not true experiments. Instead of comparing students who had been 
randomly assigned to schools that spent different amounts, these studies com- 
pare students whose parents often chose their place of residence partly on the 
basis of what they knew about the quality of the local schools. Parents who 
value  school achievement  usually  try  to live in districts that spend a lot on 
education. Most of these parents also make a special effort to help their chil- 
dren learn whatever the schools teach. Hanushek’s studies try to correct this 
source of bias by including statistical controls for parental income, education, 
family structure, and the like. But measures of this kind are imperfect proxies 
for the parental characteristics that influence residential choices and children’s 
achievement. Because the corrections for selection bias are imperfect,  these 
studies probably overestimate the effect of school spending on achievement. 
Judging by Hedges et a1.k findings, the bias is usually quite large. 
One way around this difficulty is to look at what happens when school dis- 
tricts change their expenditures. Ideally, we should do this by tracking achieve- 
ment over time in different districts, but as far as I know, nobody has done this. 
Instead, we have to rely on aggregate data for the nation as a whole. As Hanu- 
shek rightly emphasizes, public elementary and secondary schools have raised 
their real per-pupil expenditures quite steadily throughout the twentieth cen- 
tury. We do not have parallel data on student achievement until the 1970s, but 
since then it has not risen much. Nonetheless, the picture is not quite as grim 
as Hanushek suggests. The best evidence comes from the National Assessment 
of Educational Progress (NAEP), which began in  197  1. Unlike other testing 
programs, NAEP tries to test a representative national sample of students. Its 
reports show that students’ scores have mostly improved  since 1971 but that 
the mean gain has been relatively small.2 
2. The illusion that student achievement has fallen derives largely from declines in the mean 
score of those who take the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT). Unfortunately, the Educational Testing 
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Reading and math  skills probably  matter more than the other things that 
NAEP measures,  and the performance of  seventeen-year-olds matters  more 
than the performance of younger children.3 Among seventeen-year-olds near 
the bottom of  the distribution, reading  skills improved by  about a fifth of a 
standard deviation between  1971 and 1992. Among those in the top quarter of 
the  distribution, there  was  almost  no  change. Overall,  seventeen-year-olds’ 
mean reading score rose by 0.10 standard deviations (National Center for Edu- 
cation Statistics 1994, 113). 
NAEP’s time series for math skills does not begin until  1978, but it tells 
roughly the same story as the reading  series. Among seventeen-year-olds in 
the lower two-thirds of the distribution, math scores improved steadily from 
1978 to 1992. There was no improvement among students near the top of the 
distribution. Overall, mean math scores rose by about 0.15 standard deviations 
(National Center for Education Statistics 1994, 121). 
If we convert per-pupil expenditures to 1992 dollars, schools had spent a cu- 
mulative total of about $55,000 on the average seventeen-year-old by the time 
he or she was tested in 1992. If we make the same calculation for those tested in 
I97  1, the total is only half as large. If nothing else had changed, therefore, we 
could infer that doubling real spending had raised the average seventeen-year- 
old’s reading skills by about 0.10 standard deviations-a  rather modest gain. 
Taken at face value, the results for math are more encouraging. Measured in 
constant dollars, total outlays on seventeen-year-olds tested in 1992 were about 
60% higher than total outlays on those tested in  1978. Mean math scores rose 
by  about 0.15 standard deviations during this interval. If this relationship were 
really causal, we could infer that raising expenditures by 60% has about twice 
as much effect on math scores as on reading scores. This would not be surpris- 
ing, since math skills are almost entirely dependent on what students learn in 
school, whereas reading skills also depend on how students spend their leisure. 
But intertemporal comparisons of this kind may yield upwardly biased esti- 
mates for the same reason that comparisons between districts do. The social 
and economic changes that drove up school spending were linked to changes 
in what happened outside of school, and most of these changes would lead us 
to  expect  improvements  in  student  achievement  even  if  schools  had  not 
changed at all. 
The Census  Bureau  collects data  on  five family characteristics  that  are 
known to influence children’s test scores: the parents’ education, occupation, 
and income; the number of  adults in a child’s household  (two is better than 
one); and the  number of  other children in  the household  (fewer is better). 
SAT only if they want to attend a college that requires it. The colleges that require the SAT have 
changed over time, and so have their applicant pools. 
3. NAEP’s time series on seventeen-year-olds is restricted to those who were enrolled in high 
school. But the proportion of  all seventeen-year-olds enrolled  in  high school has not changed 
much since  1971, so the trend for the full cohort should parallel that for those still enrolled in 
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Parental education rose steadily during the  1970s and  1980s, as did the per- 
centage of parents working in white-collar jobs. Real parental income was also 
higher from 1975 to 1992 than from 1954 to 1971, and the number of children 
in the average family was lower. The only indicator that changed for the worse 
over this period  was the percentage  of seventeen-year-olds living with  both 
their biological parents. (More mothers also worked, but there is no consistent 
evidence that maternal employment affects teenagers’ test performance.) Judg- 
ing by their coefficients in cross-sectional data, the positive effects of improve- 
ments in parental education, occupation, and income and reductions in family 
size should have dominated the negative effect of more children’s growing up 
in a single-parent family. 
This conclusion holds for the poor as well. The proportion of all children 
living in families with incomes below the poverty line has risen since  1970. 
But those who turned seventeen in  1971 were born in  1954, and during most 
of their childhood the poverty rate for children was even higher than it is today. 
Thus if a family’s purchasing power was an important determinant of its chil- 
dren’s test scores, low-income children tested in  1992 should have done better 
than those tested in  197  1. Today’s poor children also have better educated par- 
ents and fewer siblings than their predecessors had in 197 1. Only their family 
structure has changed in a way likely to lower test performance. 
If children are learning more at home, and if real school spending has dou- 
bled, how are we to explain the fact that test scores have improved only among 
those in the bottom part of  the distribution? The most likely  explanation, I 
think, is that students in the top third of the distribution have not had much 
incentive to learn more. Although opinion leaders keep bemoaning the fact that 
American students score lower than their European  and East Asian counter- 
parts on math and science tests, I have not seen any evidence that elementary 
or secondary schools have responded to such criticism by making their curricu- 
lum more demanding. Elementary school math textbooks still proceed at the 
same leisurely pace as in 1960. High schools still assume that calculus is too 
difficult for most college-bound students. Honors classes in English and his- 
tory assign no more “difficult” books today than in the past. If anything, read- 
ing lists have gotten easier. 
Nor  do college admissions policies reward  talented  students for learning 
more. The Advanced Placement examinations are America’s closest approxi- 
mation to the curriculum-based exams that European and East Asian countries 
use to select (and hence motivate) prospective university students. In America, 
elite colleges  make their  admissions decisions before  applicants  have even 
taken these exams. Instead of relying on tests that measure how much students 
learned in high school, America’s top colleges rely on a combination of high 
school grades and the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), which measures vocabu- 
lary,  reading  comprehension,  and  mastery  of  basic  math.  Ambitious  high 
school students respond to this system by looking for teachers who gives lots 
of A’s  and by taking cram courses for the SAT, not by enrolling in courses that 96  Eric A. Hanushek 
promise to teach them a lot. 
Summarizing, I would say that (1) contrary to Hanushek, conventional “pro- 
duction function” studies suggest that higher spending raises test scores, but 
(2) these studies are probably biased, and (3) changes over time suggest that 
additional resources may make some difference for poor students’ achievement 
but do not help good students. 
If that summary judgment is correct, we must return to Hanushek’s puzzle. 
If higher spending does not boost good students’ scores, why do parents of 
talented students keep moving to districts with high school taxes? One obvious 
answer is that schools have many outputs. Until we have studied a lot of them, 
we should be cautious about assuming that parents are fools. 
Retention Rates 
Next to test performance, retention rates are the most widely used indicator 
of how schools are doing. If most students finish high school and go on to 
college, parents are satisfied. Hanushek does not discuss the handful of studies 
that have tried to link variation in districts’ per-pupil spending to variation in 
their students’ eventual educational attainment. But his figure 3.1 suggests that 
increased spending has done little to improve school retention rates since 1970. 
The  median  twenty-five-to-twenty-nine-year-old  (hereafter  the  median 
“young adult”) had completed twelve years of school in 1950. Forty years later 
the median young adult had still completed only twelve years of school. Taken 
at face value, this is puzzling. Schooling is heavily subsidized, and its mone- 
tary  value has been rising. Thus, one would expect young people to stay in 
school longer even if their schools had not improved at all. 
This particular puzzle is more apparent than real, however. Far more people 
complete exactly twelve years of school than complete any other amount. Once 
the median reaches twelve years, therefore, the distribution of schooling must 
shift a lot before the median jumps to thirteen years. In  1950, for example, 
only 53% of young adults had completed high school and fewer than 25% had 
completed  a year of college. By  1990, 86% of young adults had completed 
high school and 45% had completed  at least a year of college. This change 
implied a substantial increase in mean educational attainment. But the median 
young  adult-the  individual at the 50th percentile  of the distribution-still 
had twelve years of school. 
The Census Bureau has long recognized that the median is a poor measure 
of change in educational attainment. In an effort to deal with this problem, it 
does not report true medians. Instead, it reports what I will call an interpolated 
median. To  calculate this  statistic, the Bureau pretends that those who have 
completed any given year of school are uniformly distributed over the interval 
between that year and the next. Thus, if 40% of young adults have completed 
twelve years of school, the Bureau pretends that 4%  got  12.0 years, 4% got 
12.1 years, 4%  got 12.2 years,  and so on. This fiction allows the Bureau to 
report a small increase in the median whenever the proportion of young adults 
with twelve or more years of school rises. Hanushek’s figure 3.1 shows medi- 97  Rationalizing School Spending 
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Fig. 3C.1  Percentage of fourteen-to-twenty-four-year-olds  enrolled in school, 
by age, 1940-1993 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics 1994, table 6. 
ans of this kind. But while interpolated medians are better than true medians, 
they do not solve the basic problem. Even using interpolated medians, young 
adults' educational attainment does not appear to change much from 1950 to 
1975, and it hardly changes at all from 1975 to 1990.4 
If we want to know how much time young people are investing in schooling, 
age-specific enrollment rates are a better  guide than the median number of 
years ~ompleted.~  Figure 3C.1 shows such rates for individuals of various ages. 
Since 1945, enrollment rates have climbed for all age groups, but especially 
for those over seventeen. The 1970s are the main exception to this rule, and 
they are easy to explain. 
4. In 1991, the median for young adults finally reached 13.0 years. That means half the nation's 
young adults had completed at least one year of college. If college enrollment climbs at the same 
rate during the  1990s as during the 1980s, the median young adult may well have  14.0 years of 
school by  the end of the decade. In tables showing trends in the median, therefore, the rate of 
growth in educational attainment will appear to accelerate during the 1990s. Some analysts will 
no doubt attribute this apparent change to the fact that returns to education rose during the 1980s. 
5. Enrollment rates are not ideal measures of time spent in school, because they do not take 
account of changes in the number of hours that enrolled students spend in class or doing home- 
work. Among eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds, part-time students constituted 7% of total enroll- 
ment in 1970, 11% in 1980, and 19% in 1990. Among twenty-to-twenty-four-year-olds,  the figure 
rose from 24% in  1970 to 27% in  1980 but was still 27% in 1990 (National Center for Education 
Statistics  1994, 178). I suspect, but cannot prove, that there was a parallel decline in time spent 
preparing for class, because more full-time students were working part-time for pay. 98  Eric A. Hanushek 
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Fig. 3C.2  Percentage of high school graduates entering college, by sex, 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics 1994, table 180. 
1961-1992 
During the 1950s and 1960s, men between the ages of eighteen and twenty- 
six were likely to be drafted into the army unless they were in school. As a 
result, more men attended college than  would otherwise have done so. This 
was especially true in 1950-52  and 1965-7  1, when the country was at war and 
many draftees came home in boxes.  Military  deferments, the draft, and the 
Vietnam War all ended in the early 1970s. The percentage of male high school 
graduates entering college fell as a result (see figure 3C.2). This decline was 
probably accentuated by a temporary surplus of Vietnam-era BAS.  When these 
men entered the labor market in the early 1970s, the wage differential between 
high school and college graduates contracted, making higher education look 
like a poor investment.  In the  1980s, when the value of a BA began  to rise 
again, male college attendence also began to recover. 
Women were not subject to the draft, but  since the mid-1960s their eco- 
nomic  security has been increasingly threatened  by  the decline of marriage 
and the spread of divorce. Fewer women marry immediately after high school, 
and more of them realize that divorce may someday force them to support both 
themselves and their children. As a result, college attendance rates for women 
have risen steadily.6 
6.  The brief decline in college entrance rates among women in the early 1970s is a puzzle for 
which I have no explanation. 99  Rationalizing School Spending 
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Source: National Center for Education Statistics 1994, tables 15 and 234. 
Percentage of twenty-two-to-twenty-four-year-olds  earning BAS, by 
Going straight through college is no longer the American norm. The typical 
BA has now been out of high school for about six years. The college entrance 
rates in figure 3C.2 therefore imply that graduation rates for men should have 
fallen from 1974 to 1979, stayed low from 1979 to 1987, and risen after 1987. 
Figure 3C.3 confirms this prediction.'  By 1992, the graduation rate for men 
was almost back to its Vietnam-era peak. The rate for women was at an all- 
time high.x 
7. The numerator  for the percentages  used  to construct  figure 3C.3 is  the  number of  BAS 
awarded to individuals of a given sex in the relevant year. The denominator is a three-year moving 
average of the resident population between the ages of twenty-two and twenty-four in the relevant 
year, divided by  six. Use of  a three-year moving average gives the number of twenty-three-year- 
olds in the relevant year a weight of three, the numbers of twenty-two- and twenty-four-year-olds 
weights of two, and the numbers of twenty-one- and twenty-five-year-olds weights of one. This 
procedure comes closer to approximating the age distribution among those earning BAS than the 
use of any one birth cohort. 
Ideally, the denominator of this ratio should include members of the armed forces living over- 
seas, but such counts are not readily available. Omitting these individuals inflates the estimated 
graduation  rate,  especially  during  the Vietnam years. The calculations  implicitly  assume  that 
twenty-two-to-twenty-four-year-olds  were half male and half female throughout this period. The 
observed sex ratio rose from just under one male for every female in the  1960s to just over one 
male for every female in the 1990s. I assume this change mainly reflects changes in the size and 
composition of the overseas armed forces. 
8. The fact that more young people are earning BAS is not yet obvious using the most popular 
trend measure, which is the percentage of young adults with such a degree. This measure shows a 100  Eric A. Hanushek 
Data on college entrance  and graduation rates tell  a quite different  story 
from Hanushek’s figure 3.1. Once we adjust for the adverse effect of ending 
draft deferments, college entrance rates  have clearly risen for both men and 
women. But just as with test scores, Hanushek’s basic point may still be right, 
because we have no solid evidence linking the rise of college entrance rates to 
the rise in elementary and secondary school spending. Increases in parental 
education, declines in family size, and the rising monetary value of a BA might 
well  have driven  up college entrance  rates  even  if  school  spending  had  re- 
mained at its 1970 level. 
A better test of the relationship between spending and retention may be the 
proportion of teenagers who graduate from high school. Schooling is free at 
this age, and the opportunity cost of staying in school is low. If higher spending 
had allowed schools to provide students with more services that they valued, 
dropout rates should have fallen. That is not what happened, at least from 1970 
to 1992. At the end of the 1960s, 77% of all seventeen-year-olds were earning 
regular high school diplomas. By the early 1990s, the figure had fallen to 73% 
(National Center for Education Statistics 1994, table 99).9 
This decline in high school graduation rates was partially offset by an in- 
crease in the proportion of high school dropouts who subsequently earned cer- 
tificates  of  General  Education  Development  (GEDs). These certificates are 
widely touted as being “equivalent” to a high school diploma. As a result, the 
fraction of young adults who tell the Census Bureau that they are high school 
graduates has risen fairly steadily, even though the percentage with real diplo- 
mas has fallen. Growing demand for GEDs among dropouts makes the decline 
in the true graduation rate even harder to explain. If demand for some kind of 
diploma is rising, and if high schools have more money to spend on programs 
for prospective dropouts, the dropout rate should have fallen. That fact that this 
did not happen strongly supports Hanushek’s argument that higher spending 
yields few benefits that students value. 
Are We Measuring the Right Outputs? 
We are left with the question of why so many parents prefer school districts 
that spend a lot to those that spend less. If higher spending does not raise either 
test scores or retention rates, what other school outputs might lead parents to 
choose such districts? Three possibilities deserve attention. First, schools with 
big budgets  may  teach  their students all sorts of skills and information that 
college graduation rate of 21.9% in  1975, 22.2% in  1985, 23.2% in  1990, and 23.7% in  1993 
(National Center for Education Statistics 1994, table 8). Changes in this measure lag about five 
years behind changes in the actual graduation rate. 
9. Not all high school graduates are seventeen years old, of course. But the graduation rate does 
not change appreciably if  one compares the number of diplomas awarded to a weighted average 
of  seventeen-, eighteen-, and nineteen-year-olds. I should also note that high school graduation 
rates fell after 1970 despite a modest increase in the proportion of all fourteen-to-seventeen-year- 
olds enrolled in school (see figure 3C.l). These two trends are not necessarily contradictory, but 
reconciling them might prove difficult. 101  Rationalizing School Spending 
standardized tests do not measure. Second, school spending may also improve 
students’ social skills, character traits, or behavior. Third, school spending may 
improve the quality of students’ lives while they are still enrolled in school. 
Are  We Using the Right Tests? Social scientists have traditionally  measured 
school output using multiple-choice  tests that cover basic  skills like reading 
and math. Until recently,  most of these tests were designed to minimize the 
impact of having attended one school rather than another. Testers would not 
ask students to identify Scylla or Charybdis, for example, because they knew 
that some schools did not teach  The Odyssey, and they did not want to put 
students from such schools at a disadvantage. 
Test design also reflected psychometricians’ interest in measuring what they 
saw as unitary traits, such as “intelligence” or “mathematical skills.” When test 
designers had  to decide whether  to include  a given  item,  they  did not ask 
whether it measured something students needed to know. Instead, they asked 
whether students who answered the item correctly also answered other items 
on the test correctly. If a given math item did not correlate well with other math 
items, it was discarded. This procedure had two rationales. First, it was often 
said that an item could not be a good measure of math skills if it did not corre- 
late with other items that measured math skills. Second, low interitem correla- 
tions make a test less reliable. 
If  a math test is restricted to items that correlate highly with one another, 
it is likely to measure  mathematical  aptitude rather than mastery  of specific 
mathematical skills. Mathematical aptitude is obviously worth measuring. But 
if you want to know whether schools that spend more money teach more math, 
aptitude tests will not always give the right answer. Suppose, for example, that 
affluent districts teach calculus while poor districts do not. Expenditures will 
then have a big effect on the number of students who pass the Advanced Place- 
ment calculus exam. But expenditures may  not have much impact on  basic 
math skills, because even students in poorly financed districts may have spent 
many hours in classes that teach these skills. 
Since 1970, testers have begun to put more emphasis on measuring  skills 
and information that teachers judge important. The NAEP tests try to do this, 
for example. But much of what we think we know about the effect of educa- 
tional spending reflects the results of studies that use less appropriate tests. 
Noncognitive Outcomes. Employers care about workers’ social skills, charac- 
ter, and behavior on the job as well as their cognitive skills. Few employers 
want workers who shirk, no matter how well they spell. Nobody knows pre- 
cisely which  noncognitive traits matter most to employers. But we do know 
that test performance accounts for less than half the correlation between years 
of  schooling  and  earnings. This fact  suggests that  individuals  who stay  in 
school must have more than their share of the noncognitive traits that employ- 
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Since we do not know which noncognitive traits contribute to the correlation 
between  schooling  and earnings, we do not know whether  schools with big 
budgets are especially good at developing  these traits. If generously  funded 
schools run more smoothly, need fewer arbitrary rules, and resolve conflicts 
more amicably, their alumni may become better workers. Such a pattern might 
help reconcile the weak relationship between changes in school spending and 
student achievement with Card and Krueger’s (1992) finding that children born 
in states with high per-pupil expenditures earn more than children born in less 
generous states, regardless of where they live in adulthood. 
Schooling as Consumption. When social scientists measure the effects of edu- 
cational spending, they usually look for outcomes that seem likely to predict 
students’ future success. But a large part of any school’s budget is spent on 
making the quality  of  students’  lives  better right  now. When  a high  school 
decides to build a swimming pool or a basketball court, it does not claim that 
this will make the school’s alumni more employable. Likewise, when my sub- 
urban elementary school district decided to lengthen the school day by adding 
half  an hour for art and music,  it did not tell  taxpayers or parents that this 
change would help children find better jobs when they grew up. It claimed that 
art and music would enrich the children’s lives immediately. A large fraction of 
any school’s budget  should therefore  be seen as consumption rather than in- 
vestment.’(’ 
The line between  investment  and consumption is, of  course, often quite 
murky. Schools may, for example, claim that they want to cut class size in order 
to raise achievement. The real reason for cutting class size, however, is usually 
that  teachers and students  prefer  small  classes.  That does not  mean  small 
classes are a waste of money. It just means they should be seen partly as con- 
sumption rather than as a pure investment.’(’ 
Americans now spend almost a fifth of their life attending school. During 
these years they spend roughly a quarter of their waking hours in school. Thus, 
even if parents thought that school spending had no effect whatever on their 
children’s long-term prospects, they might still choose to allocate a significant 
fraction  of their disposable income to making  their children’s life at school 
more enjoyable. If parents reason this way, we might expect the consumption 
component of the education budget to rise in tandem with GDP. Trends since 
1970 are consistent  with such a model. Education claimed 7.6% of GDP in 
1993, compared to 7.5% in 1970. 
10. Expenditures aimed  at keeping  the  political  peace, such  as bilingual  education, main- 
streaming slow learners, or busing students to reduce racial segregation, are also hard to classify 
on a consumption-investment spectrum. Schools often have future-oriented  rationales for spending 
money on such programs, but they seldom evaluate these programs by  asking whether they raise 
students’ test scores or adult earnings. School boards establish these programs in order to resolve 
current social and political conflicts, and they judge the programs successful if conflict diminishes. 
A significant part of the increase in spending after 1970 may have been of this kind. 103  Rationalizing School Spending 
One might  argue that  education’s share of  GDP should  have  fallen  after 
1970, because school-age children constituted a declining fraction of the popu- 
lation. But Americans had fewer children partly because they wanted to spend 
more on each child. Thus, the fact that educational outlays rose at about the 
same rate as GDP might not have struck most parents as alarming even if they 
had known the extra money would have no long-term effect on their children 
after they  finished  school. Such consumption-oriented  parents  should, how- 
ever, have been worried by the fact that higher spending was not lowering the 
dropout rate. This fact suggests that higher outlays were not even reducing the 
proportion of students who hated school. 
Policy Implications 
Throughout the  1980s, commentators  of every political stripe complained 
about schools’ failure to prepare  their  students for skilled jobs. During the 
1950s and 1960s, legislators responded to actual and anticipated shortages of 
skilled labor by  making it easier for the young to attend college. States kept 
tuition at public institutions low, and they built new campuses so that more 
students could attend college while living at home. In 1958, the federal govern- 
ment  began  offering  prospective  college  students low-interest  loans. Later, 
Congress authorized direct grants to low-income students. 
During the 1980s, legislators followed precisely the opposite policy, asking 
students to pay a rising fraction of what it cost to educate them. Tuition and 
fees accounted for 17% of revenue at public colleges and universities in 1991, 
compared to 13% in 1980 (National Center for Education Statistics 1994, table 
3 17). Legislators could have justified  this change in policy by  arguing that 
college  students  reap most  of  the  benefits  associated  with  earning a  BA, 
so they should also pay most of the costs. But arguments of this kind were 
rare. Most legislators just said that the state’s budget was tight, that taxpayers 
were unwilling to pay more, and that students would therefore have to pay the 
difference.  This  explanation  sounds  quite plausible.  Yet  as Hanushek  em- 
phasizes,  fiscal  austerity  did  not  slow  the growth  of  per-pupil  spending  at 
the elementary or secondary level. How are we to reconcile these disparate 
trends? 
The simplest explanation is that spending patterns were driven mainly by 
institutional inertia rather than student demand. If we ignore changes in enroll- 
ment and look only at total outlays, spending on higher education rose slightly 
faster than  spending on elementary  and secondary  education between  1970 
and 1990. It is only when we take account of enrollment changes that spending 
patterns diverge. At the postsecondary level, enrollments rose almost as fast as 
total real outlays, leaving expenditure per student almost unchanged. At the 
elementary and secondary level, enrollment fell, making expenditure per pupil 
rise even faster than total spending. The results are apparent in figure 3C.4. 
The solid line shows that public  elementary and secondary schools doubled 
their real spending between  1968 and  1992. The dashed line shows that col- 104  Eric A. Hanushek 
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Fig. 3C.4  Expenditure per student: elementary and secondary versus higher 
education, 1960-1992 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics 1994, table  165 and 238. 
leges and universities raised their real outlays per student by only 12% during 
this period.ll 
I know of no empirical research comparing the social rate of return to sub- 
sidies for different levels of education. Nonetheless, I suspect that most Ameri- 
cans subscribe to the  basic  proposition  with  which  I  began  this  comment, 
which is that increasing the amount of time students invest in their own educa- 
tion yields higher returns than increasing the amount of time adults invest in 
each student’s education. Thus, if the voters had been given a choice, I think 
most of them would have preferred to spend less money expanding the payrolls 
of elementary  and  secondary schools and more  money  helping high school 
graduates attend college. Certainly I would have favored such a policy. 
Perhaps the most disturbing fact about America’s present system of educa- 
tional governance is that this possibility was never even discussed. Perhaps that 
is an inescapable cost of democracy, which puts ultimate power in the hands 
of people who seldom pay attention. Such a system gives politicians a strong 
11. Both sets of figures are adjusted using the Consumer Price Index, which overstates inflation 
during the 1970s. Neither series presents a realistic picture of changes in the cost of educational 
inputs (e.g., teachers of  constant quality). The figures for higher education cover “educational and 
general expenditures.” Both sets of  figures exclude capital investment. 105  Rationalizing School Spending 
incentive  to  postpone  choices  whenever  possible.  In  education,  avoiding 
choices led to steady growth of  support for all levels of  schooling, regardless 
of whether demand for their services was rising or falling. 
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